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Case No. 20070025-CA
INTHE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah,
Plaintiff / Appellee,
vs.

Russell David Harry,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a conviction of possession of methamphetamine, a
third felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West 2004).1 This
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004).
ISSUE PRESENTED
Was the verdict-urging instruction given to the deadlocked jury unduly
coercive?
Standard of Review. This Court reviews for correctness a trial court's
instructions to the jury, including supplemental instructions given to a deadlocked
jury. See State v. Clements, 967 P.2d 957,959 (Utah App. 1998).
defendant was also convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol or
drugs, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502 (West
2004). R. 243. However, he has not challenged his conviction on that count. See
Aplt. Brf. at 48.

RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF LAW
This case is not dependent on the textual interpretation of any constitutional
provision, statute, or rule.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by Information with possession of methamphetamine,
a third degree felony, and driving under the influence of drugs, a class B
misdemeanoR. R. 1-3.2 The first trial was declared a mistrial because the judge
inadvertently mentioned that defendant was in jail. R. 112-14; R. 304:163-66,184-88.
On the second day of the new trial, the case was submitted to the jury for
deliberations at 11:54 a.m. R. 203-04. After nearly three and one-half hours, the jury
notified the court that it had reached a verdict on count II (DUI), but was
deadlocked 7-1 on count I (possession of methamphetamine). R. 204; R. 343: 227.
After the court gave an additional instruction encouraging the jury to reach a
unanimous verdict, the jury deliberated another 26 minutes and returned guilty
verdicts on both counts as charged. R. 204, 242-43. The court later sentenced
defendant to a prison term of zero-to-five years on count I and a concurrent jail term
of 180 days on count II. R. 269-70. The court suspended the sentences and placed

2

Defendant was also charged with improper registration and faulty
equipment, but those charges were not brought to trial. See R. 2,213,221; R. 294: 4;
R. 304:1.
2

defendant on supervised probation for 36 months. R. 270-71. Defendant timely
appealed. R. 276-77.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
While on patrol near midnight on September 16,2005, Trooper Jared Garcia
of the Utah Highway Patrol (UHP) observed a car with no front license plate and a
cracked front windshield. R. 294: 19, 51. Trooper Garcia turned his patrol car
around to pursue the vehicle and, as he did so, noticed that the car had an expired
temporary permit on the rear license plate. R. 294: 19-20, 50. Trooper Garcia
activated his emergency lights and stopped the vehicle. R. 294: 20, 51-52,151-52.
Trooper Garcia approached the vehicle, identified the driver as defendant, and
requested defendant's driver's license, the vehicle registration, and proof of
insurance. R. 294: 20,153.
In speaking with defendant, Trooper Garcia noticed that defendant's speech
was "extremely slow" and difficult to understand, his eyes were bloodshot, his
pupils "appeared to be dilated," and his hands had "pick type marks or sores" on
them. R. 294:21,52-53. Additionally, defendant was "very fidgety," was "breathing
heavily," and was "shaking." R. 294: 21,53. Based on these observations, Trooper
Garcia suspected that defendant was impaired from drug use. R. 294: 21, 54.
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Trooper Garcia confronted defendant with his suspicions but defendant
denied any drug use. R. 294:21. Trooper Garcia, a trained drug recognition expert,
asked defendant to get out of his car to perform a series of field sobriety tests. R.
294: 21-22, 55-64. After administering the field sobriety tests, Trooper Garcia
concluded that defendant was impaired from drug use and arrested him. R. 294:2234. He handcuffed defendant and frisked him for weapons, but found none. R. 294:
34-36,65-68,156. Before placing defendant in the backseat of the patrol car, Trooper
Garcia showed defendant that the backseat was empty and warned him that he
would be subject to additional criminal penalties if he brought contraband into the
jail. R. 294: 36, 39-40, 68-69, 73,156,167-68. After defendant acknowledged that
nothing was in the patrol car, Trooper Garcia sat him in the backseat, buckled him
in, and closed the dooR. R. 294: 40-41,167.
Thereafter, Trooper Garcia began an inventory search of defendant's caR. R.
294:41,70. During the search, he noticed that defendant was moving around in the
patrol car, causing it to "shake." R. 294: 41-42,157. Trooper Garcia returned to his
patrol car and opened the back door where defendant was sitting. R. 294:42-43. A
blue-tinted plastic bag fell down between the seat and the dooR. R. 294:43. Trooper
Garcia asked defendant to exit the vehicle and, when defendant did so, the trooper
saw two more plastic baggies. R. 294: 43-44. One of the baggies contained a white
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crystal substance Trooper Garcia believed, and subsequent testing confirmed, to be
methamphetamine. R. 294: 44, 129-33; SE3. Trooper Garcia seized the plastic
baggies and later booked them into evidence. R. 294: 48, 75-76. After advising
defendant of his Miranda rights, Trooper Garcia asked him why he tried to hide the
drugs, when he had already been shown that the vehicle was empty. R. 294: 45.
Defendant said he did not know the drugs were in his poncho. R. 294:45. Trooper
Garcia conducted a more thorough search of defendant's person for drugs and
placed him back into the patrol caR. R. 294: 44-45.
After finishing the inventory search, Trooper Garcia transported defendant
to the Salt Lake County Jail. R. 294:44-45. During transport, Trooper Garcia asked
defendant when he last used methamphetamine and again asked him why he had
tried to hide the drugs.

R. 294: 46.

Defendant admitted that he had used

methamphetamine earlier that day and explained that he tried to hide the drugs in
an attempt to avoid further trouble. R. 294: 46, 75. After defendant arrived at the
jail, he consented to a blood draw and a sample was taken for testing. R. 294:46-47,
75, 82-83.

The

blood

sample

tested

positive

for

amphetamine

and

methamphetamine. R. 294: 95-99; SE1.
At trial, defendant claimed that his bloodshot eyes, lack of balance, and heavy
breathing were present because he was "extremely tired" that night and suffering
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from allergies. R. 294:153-55,163-64. He claimed that the sores on his hands were
from going through dumpsters and salvaging for scrap metal. R. 294:156,164. He
explained that he did not perform well on the field sobriety tests because he was
suffering from rheumatoid arthritis. R. 294: 154, 162. He also suggested that
Trooper Garcia planted the drugs. See 157-58,168-70. Finally, he claimed that the
presence of methamphetamine and amphetamine in his blood was the result of his
earlier use of a nose inhaler to help him breath, which he had found at a nursing
home while looking through dumpsters. R. 294:149-50.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A verdict-urging instruction, also known as an Allen instruction, may not be
so coercive so as to deny a defendant the right to a fair and impartial trial. To
determine whether an Allen instruction is unduly coercive, this Court examines the
content of the instruction and the context in which it is given. The Allen instruction
given in this case was not coercive per se. It appropriately underscored the
importance of the case, urged the jury to reach a unanimous verdict, and instructed
the jurors to carefully consider the opinions of the other jurors in their effort to reach
a unanimous verdict. The instruction effectively counterbalanced that admonition,
including its reference to the expense of trial, the necessity of a retrial, and minority
jurors, with a charge to each juror not to give up his or her conscientiously held
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opinions and a reminder of the presumption of defendant's innocence and the
burden of proof imposed upon the state.
The Allen instruction was also not coercive under the circumstances of the
case. After the jury returned the verdicts, the court polled the jurors. Each
unequivocally affirmed that the verdict was his or her own, thus demonstrating that
the jurors were not coerced into a verdict.

Moreover, the Allen instruction

incorporated the pre-deliberation instructions, which complied with the ABA
recommendations. Both instructions impressed upon the jurors that they should not
give up their conscientiously held opinions. Moreover, the court properly gave the
Allen instruction after the jury indicated it was deadlocked. Finally, the jury's return
of a verdict almost 30 minutes after receiving the Allen instruction does not suggest
that they were unduly pressured into reaching agreement.
Finally, contrary to defendant's claim, due process does not require that this
Court disavow the Allen instruction and its various forms in favor of the ABArecommended standard. And in any event, this Court may not disavow the noncoercive use of the Allen instruction where both the United States Supreme Court
and the Utah Supreme Court have approved it.

7

ARGUMENT
THE ALLEN INSTRUCTION GIVEN BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS
NOT UNDULY COERCIVE
On appeal, defendant contends that the verdict-urging instruction given by
the trial court below "had the potential to be, and was, coercive yer se." Aplt. Brf.
at 24. He also argues that "under the circumstances of this case, the instruction was
coercive,... plac[ing] undue pressure on a single juror/ 7 Aplt. Brf. at 24. He argues
that as a result, he was effectively deprived "of a fair trial and the individual
decision of each juror," and that his conviction for drug possession should thus be
reversed. Aplt. Brf. at 24. Defendant also asks the Court to "disavow use [of the
Allen instruction] in this jurisdiction." Aplt. Brf. at 24. Contrary to defendant's
claim, the Allen instruction given by the trial court was not coercive. Moreover, this
Court should decline defendant's invitation to disavow use of the Allen instruction,
and should instead continue to review Allen instructions under the analysis
articulated in State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23 (Utah App. 1998).
A. The Trial Court Gave the Allen Instruction after the Jury Sent a
Note to the Court Indicating that One Juror Was Still Undecided
and Would Not Change.
Both the State and defendant presented their cases and rested on the first day
of trial. See R. 294:144,170. On the second day of trial, the jury received the jury
instructions and heard closing arguments. R. 343:175-225. At 11:54 a.m., the jury
8

retired to deliberate. R. 203-04; R. 343:178-225. After deliberating for an unspecified
period of time, the jury sent a note to the court requesting to look at a highway
patrol car similar to the one driven by Trooper Garcia and asking what type of shoes
and shirt defendant was wearing, whether he was wearing socks, and where his
pocket was located. R. 265; R. 343:226-27. Without objection from counsel, the court
returned the note to the jury with a written response on the reverse side, indicating
that "[t]he jury has received all of the evidence that it's going to receive" and
directing the jury to "[p]lease rely on your individual & collective memories for
what the evidence was." R. 265; R. 343: 226-27.
At 3:18 p.m., the jury sent the court a second note, this time indicating an
impasse in deliberations:
We have come to a unanimous decision on
Count II. However for Count I we are 7-1 and
the jurors [sic] is undecided and will not
change.
/ s / Brian Koji
R. 204; R. 265 (Addendum A); R. 343:227. After discussing the matter with counsel,
the court proposed a verdict-urging instruction.

R. 343: 227-30. Counsel for

defendant objected, arguing that it "place [d] undue pressure upon that single juror."
R. 343: 230. The court overruled defendant's objection and gave the following
verdict-urging instruction:

9

ffi 1 ] . . . Members of the jury, I'm going to ask that you continue
your deliberations in an effort to agree upon a verdict and dispose of
this case. I have a few additional comments I would like for you to
consider as you do so.
[^[2] This is an important case. The trial has been expensive in
time, effort and money to both the defense and the prosecution. If you
should fail to agree on a verdict, the case is left open and must be tried
again. Obviously another trial would only serve to increase the costs
to both sides; and there is no reason to believe that the case can be tried
again by either side better or more exhaustively than it has been tried
before you.
[^|3] Any future jury must be selected in the same manner and
from the same source as you were chosen; and there is no reason to
believe that the case could ever be submitted to eight men and women
more conscientious, more impartial, or more competent to decide it; or
that a more clear or clearer evidence-excuse me-or that more clear or
clearer evidence could be produced on behalf of either side.
[Tf4] In order to bring eight minds to a unanimous result, you
must examine the questions submitted to you with candor and
frankness and with proper deference to and regard for the opinions of
each otheR. That is to say in conferring together, each of you should
pay due attention and respect to the views of the others, and listen to
each other's arguments with the disposition to re-examine your own
views.
[^|5] If a substantial majority of your number are for a conviction,
each dissenting juror ought to consider whether a doubt in his or her
own mind is a reasonable one, since it appears to make no effective
impression upon the minds of so many equally conscientious fellow
jurors, who bear the same responsibility, serve under the same oath,
and have heard the same evidence, with, we may assume, the same
attention and equal desire to arrive at the truth.
[^f6] On the other hand, if a majority or even a lesser number of
you are for acquittal, the other jurors ought to ask themselves again,
and most thoughtfully, whether they do not have a reason to doubt the
correction of a judgment, which is not shared by several of their fellow
jurors, and whether they should distrust the weight and sufficiency of
evidence which fails to convince several of their fellow jurors beyond
a reasonable doubt.
10

[^[7] You are not partisans. You are judges; judges of the facts.
Your sole interest here is to seek the truth from the evidence in the case.
Remember at all times that no juror is expected to yield a conscientious
conviction he or she may have as to the weight or effect of the evidence;
but remember also that after full deliberation and consideration of the
evidence in the case, it is your duty to agree upon a verdict if you can
do so without surrendering your conscientious conviction.
[f 8] You must also remember that if the evidence in the case fails
to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused should have
your unanimous verdict of not guilty. In order to make a decision
more practicable in all cases imposes the burden of proof on one party
or the otheR. In this case the burden of proof is on the State. You may
be as leisurely in your deliberations as the occasion may require, and
should take all the time which you may feel is necessary, including
recessing until tomorrow.
[Tf 9] I will ask now that you retire once again, and continue your
deliberations with these additional comments in mind to be applied in
conjunction with all of the instructions I have previously given to you.
R. 343: 231-33.3
After receiving the Allen instruction, the jury resumed deliberations and 26
minutes later returned guilty verdicts on both counts as charged. R. 204; R. 343:23435. The judge then asked whether "either counsel [would] like the jury polled." R.
343:235. Defense counsel responded in the affirmative. R. 343:235. The court clerk
then asked the jurors "to answer 'yes' or 'no' to the following question: Were these
and are these now your verdicts?" R. 343: 235. All eight jurors answered, "Yes."
R. 343: 235-36.

3

Like defendant, the State enumerates the paragraphs for ease of reference in
analyzing the instruction.
11

B . A l l e n Instructions Are Permissible So Long As They Are Not
Unduly Coercive.
An instruction urging a deadlocked jury to continue deliberations in an
attempt to reach a unanimous verdict, as the one given here, is generally referred to
as an "Allen instruction77 or "Allen charge/ 7 The instruction takes its name from the
United States Supreme Court case that first approved use of such verdict-urging
instructions, Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896). The instruction given in Allen
informed the jury, in substance, that:
in a large proportion of cases absolute certainty could not be expected;
that, although the verdict must be the verdict of each individual juror,
and not a mere acquiescence in the conclusion of his fellows, yet they
should examine the question submitted with candor, and with a proper
regard and deference to the opinions of each other; that it was their
duty to decide the case if they could conscientiously do so; that they
should listen, with a disposition to be convinced, to each other's
arguments; that, if much the larger number were for conviction, a
dissenting juror should consider whether his doubt was a reasonable
one which made no impression upon the minds of so many men,
equally honest, equally intelligent with himself. If, [ ] on the other hand,
the majority were for acquittal, the minority ought to ask themselves
whether they might not reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment
which was not concurred in by the majority.
Id. at 501.
On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court found no error in the instruction. Id.
at 502. The Court recognized that although "the verdict of the jury should represent
the opinion of each individual juror/ 7 the opinions of individual jurors may in fact
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"be changed by conference in the jury room/ 7 Id. at 501. The Court explained that
'"[t]he very object of the jury system is to secure unanimity by a comparison of
views, and by arguments among the jurors themselves/ 7 Id. The Court thus
approved use of an instruction that counsels each juror to "listen with deference to
the arguments, and with a distrust of his own judgment, if he finds a large majority
of the jury taking a different view of the case from what he does himself/7 Id.
Continuing, the Court explained that" [i] t cannot be that each juror should go to the
jury room with a blind determination that the verdict shall represent his opinion of
the case at that moment, or that he should close his ears to the arguments of men
who are equally honest and intelligent as himself.77 Id. at 501-02.
Since Allen, courts have frequently given the instruction, in one form or
another, to deadlocked juries. An instruction that tracks the language in Allen is
often referred to as a "pure77 or "traditional77 Allen instruction, while an instruction
that modifies

the original Allen

instruction,

"whether

by

omission

or

embellishment," is referred to as a "modified" Allen instruction. United States v.
McElhiney, 275 F.3d 928,936 (10th Cir. 2001). For purposes of this brief, the State will
refer to any such instruction simply as an Allen instruction. "Typically, [Allen
instructions] recognize the dynamics of group deliberation and are distilled into two
plausible admonitions, that if not competing, are certainly in tension: each juror
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should adhere to conscientious convictions; and jurors in the minority should
reconsider their opinions in the light of those held by the majority/ 7 United States v.
Zabriskie, 415 F.3d 1139,1147-48 (10th Cir. 2005).
As aptly noted by the Tenth Circuit, "the substance of the Allen charge is the
salutary admonition of Oliver Cromwell: 'I beseech you . . ., think it possible you
may be mistaken/" United States v. Smith, 857 F.2d 682,684 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting
Cromwell's speech to the Scottish clergy, August 3,1650, Gardiner, History of the
Commonwealth and Protectorate, 2nd ed. 1897,1, 307). But since Allen was decided,
many "courts have become concerned that the Allen charge might have a coercive
element—in other words, that a jury might interpret the instruction... as an order
to agree/' McElhiney, 275 F.3d at 937; accord State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851,861 (Utah
1992); State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021,1022 n.l (Utah 1987); State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23,
29 (Utah App. 1988). In that case, the instruction would constitute "'a denial of [a
defendant's right to] a fair and impartial trial, and, hence . . . a denial of due
process.'" McElhiney, 275 F.3d at 937 (quotingMills v. Tinsley, 314 F.2d 311,313 (10th
Cir. 1963)).
Just over 100 years after Allen was decided, the United States Supreme Court
addressed just such a claim in Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988). In Lowenfield,
a jury found the defendant guilty of two counts of manslaughter and three counts
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of capital murdeR. Id. at 233. Prior to the jury's sentencing deliberations, the trial
court admonished the jurors that they ""should consider the views of others with the
objective of reaching a verdict, but that they should not surrender their own honest
beliefs in doing so/ 7 Id. at 234. The court also advised the jury that ""if [they] were
unable to reach a unanimous [sentencing] recommendation, the court would impose
a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of probation, parole, or
suspension of sentence/" Id.
After nearly a day and a half of deliberations, the jury informed the trial judge
that they were unable to reach a decision and "requested] that the court again
advise the jury as to its responsibilities/" Id. After polling the jurors, the trial judge
learned that eleven believed further deliberations would assist them in reaching a
verdict, but that one juror did not. Id. at 234-35. The court then gave an Allen
instruction:
'"Ladies and Gentlemen, as I instructed you earlier if the jury is
unable to unanimously agree on a recommendation the Court shall
impose the sentence of Life Imprisonment without benefit of Probation,
Parole, or Suspension of Sentence.
""When you enter the jury room it is your duty to consult with
one another to consider each other's views and to discuss the evidence
with the objective of reaching a just verdict if you can do so without
violence to that individual judgment.
'"Each of you must decide the case for yourself but only after
discussion and impartial consideration of the case with your fellow
jurors. You are not advocates for one side or the otheR. Do not hesitate
to reexamine your own views and to change your opinion if you are
15

convinced you are wrong but do not surrender your honest belief as to
the weight and effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your
fellow jurors or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict/7
Id. at 235 (citation omitted). Thirty minutes later, the jury returned a sentencing
recommendation of death on all three murder counts. Id.
On certiorari, the defendant argued that the instruction "had coerced the
sentence verdicts from the jury/' Id. at 236. After considering the instruction "'in
its context and under all the circumstances/" the Court concluded that the
instruction was not coercive and reaffirmed "[t]he continuing validity of th[e]
Court's observations in Allen." Id. (citation omitted). The Court also noted that
Allen's holding "appl[ied] with even greater force in [that] case..., where the charge
given, in contrast to the so-called 'traditional Allen charge,' d[id] not speak
specifically to the minority jurors." Id.
A year after Lowenfield was decided, the Utah Supreme Court considered the
propriety of an Allen instruction in State v. Thomas, 777 P.2d 445 (Utah 1989). After
deliberating for three hours, the jury informed the trial court that they "had reached
an impasse at six to two, without indicating whether this was for acquittal or
conviction." Id. at 447. In response, the trial judge gave a verdict-urging instruction
"to the effect that three hours was 'not a very long time' to consider a [rape] case
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.. .and that the jury should 'reconvene and see if you can't solve your problems and
reach a verdict/" Id.
The Utah Supreme Court had no difficulty in concluding that the instruction
was not unduly coercive. The Court observed that the instruction "was not directed
specifically toward the minority jurors, nor [did it include] any suggestion that the
jurors should surrender their individual views of conscience." Id. at 448. The Court
thus concluded that the "[c]riticism which has been leveled at giving an Allen charge
simply [was] not applicable" in the case. Id.
Four years later, the Utah Supreme Court again considered the propriety of
an Allen instruction in State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992). Unlike the
instructions given in Allen, Lowenfield, and Thomas, the instruction in Brown was
given before the jury retired to deliberate:
The Court instructs the Jury that although the verdict to which
each Juror agrees must, of course, be each Juror [']s own conclusion, and
not a mere acquiescence in the conclusion of fellow Jurors yet, in order
to bring eight minds to a unanimous result the Jurors should examine
with candor the questions submitted to them, with due regard and
deference to the opinions of each otheR. A dissenting Juror should
consider whether their [sic] state of mind is a reasonable one, when it
makes no impression on the minds of so many Jurors equally honest,
equally intelligent, who have heard the same evidence, with an equal
desire to arrive at the truth, under the sanction of the same oath. You
are not to give up a conscientious conclusion after you have reached
such a conclusion finally, but it is your duty to confer with your fellow
Jurors carefully and earnestly, and with a desire to do absolute justice
both to the State and to the Defendant
17

Id. at 861. Brown argued that this instruction deprived him "'of the benefit of the
convictions of each individual juror/" Id.
The Utah Supreme Court recognized that the Allen instruction "has ... been
criticized as tending to pressure jurors into giving up their sincere convictions
merely because a majority reached a different conclusion" and the Court
"acknowledged that [an Allen] instruction has the potential to be coercive, if given
to jurors who have reached an impasse." Id. But after examining the instruction's
"content" and the "context" in which it was given, the Court found that the
instruction was not unduly coercive because it "was given prior to jury deliberations
and [it] specifically directed the jurors not to give up their own 'conscientious
conclusions/" Id. The Court concluded that "the inherent danger of coercion
resulting from the instruction [was thus] dissipated, if not lost." Id.
Although the Utah Supreme Court in Thomas and Brown addressed the
coercive effects of the respective Allen instructions given in those cases, it did not
elaborate on the analytical framework used to determine whether such an
instruction is coercive. This Court did so in State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23 (Utah App.
1988).
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After deliberating approximately five hours, the jury in Lactod informed the
trial judge that they were having difficulty reaching a verdict. Id. at 28. Without
informing counsel beforehand, the judge gave an Allen instruction to the jury:
I need to have a chat with you folks. I understand you are having
a difficult time in there. I'm getting nods of heads yes. I want to
encourage you as best you can to reach some kind of agreement, and
the reason is simple. If you don't reach an agreement and the jury
hangs up and cannot come to any kind of agreement we get to send
you folks home and reschedule this whole thing and start over again.
Now, I'm sure you don't want to do that. I'm sure we don't want to do
that either, because one problem is I'm only going to be here another
six or eight weeks and we don't have another day to do this case. We
would very much like to get a settlement out of this matter if we can.
Now, you add up the time we have all got involved in this case and we
have got two or three weeks into it figuring all our individual time. I
want you to go back and give it another effort. Be open minded,
understanding.
Be compromising as best you can without
surrendering your honest and true feelings, because we don't want you
to go in there and let everybody walk all over you. But on the other
hand if there's any way possible to reach an agreement let us know. If
not then I'm not going to let you go too much longeR. But I think if you
give it another shot maybe you can. It's worked before on lots of other
jurys [sic], and I hope it will tonight because I certainly don't want to
throw away this day. You folks have put too much time and effort into
it, as well as these folks out here whose day it is. So if you folks will go
back to the jury room and take a few deep breaths and relax and start
over again, I would really appreciate it. Okay?
Id. After "evaluating the instruction as a whole, taking in it in context with the trial
itself and the jury deliberations," the Court concluded that the instruction did "not
. . . reach the level of coerciveness amounting to a denial of a fair and impartial jury
trial." M.at32.
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In upholding the instruction, the Court observed that Lowenfield had
reaffirmed the "'well settled proposition'" that a trial court may"'impress upon [a
deadlocked jury] the importance of the case, urge them to come to agreement, and
send them back for further deliberation/" Id. (quoting Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 236).
The Court acknowledged the concerns raised by other jurisdictions, and by the
American Bar Association (ABA), regarding the possible coercive effects of giving
such a verdict-urging instruction. Id. at 29-30. Notwithstanding those concerns, the
Court refused to abandon its use.

Id. at 30. The Court recognized that an

appropriate Allen instruction is "a reasonable and proper exercise of the [trial]
court's power to guide the jury to a fair and impartial verdict." Id. It "also
recognize[d] the other legitimate purposes served by such a charge, namely, 'the
avoidance of the societal costs of a retrial' both in time and money, and the 'possible
loss of evidence that a new trial would entail.'" Id. (quoting Lowenfield, 108 S.Ct. at
551,558).
The Court concluded that Lowenfield created a two-tiered analysis for
determining whether a particular Allen instruction is unduly coercive. First, the
court must "consider whether the language of the supplemental charge can properly
be said to be coercive" per se. Id. at 30-31. And second, the court must consider
"whether [the supplemental charge] is coercive under the specific circumstances of
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the case." Id. at 30. The instruction will be upheld so long as it is not coercive in
either instance.
Referencing the first tier of the analysis, the Court held that" [t]he judge may
appropriately admonish the jury to 'deliberate together in an atmosphere of mutual
deference and respect giving due consideration to the views of others in the
knowledge that in the end their verdict must reflect the composite views of all/" Id.
(quoting Burroughs v. United States, 365 F.2d 431,434 (10th Or. 1966)). The Court
held that the judge "may counterbalance such an admonition with a charge to the
jury members to not give up their conscientiously held opinions, and may also
remind the jurors of the presumption of defendant's innocence and the burden of
proof imposed upon the state/ 7 Id. at 30-31 (internal citations omitted).
Although the Court observed that "there is no prescribed 'ritual of words',
indicating whether the language of an Allen charge is coercive," it noted that "certain
inherently coercive i d e a s . . . should not be included in an Allen charge." Id. (citation
omitted). For example, the Court held that an Allen instruction should not tell the
jury that they must reach a decision in the case. Id. at 31 (citing Jenkins v. United
States ,380 U.S. 445, 446 (1965)(per curiam)). The Court also held that an Allen
instruction "'should not overemphasize the importance of an agreement, suggest
that any juror surrender his [or her] independent judgment, or say or do anything
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from which the jury could possibly infer that the court is indicating anxiety for or
demanding some verdict, or subjecting the jury to the hardships of long
deliberations/" Id. (quoting State v. Thomas, 342 P.2d 197, 200 (Ariz. 1959)).
The Court held that in assessing the coercive effect of an instruction in light
of the specific circumstances of the case, courts "may consider . . . 'any colloquy
between the judge and the jury foreman, circumstances surrounding the giving of
the instruction, a n d . . .the American Bar Association Standards on Criminal Justice
Relating to Trial by Jury/" Id. (quoting United States v. Dyba, 554 R2d 417,421 (10th
Cir.1977)).
The ABA standards referenced by the Court in Lactod suggest that a trial court
give a verdict-urging instruction before the jury retires to deliberate. Length of
Deliberations; Deadlocked Jury, ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, 15-5.4 (3rd ed.
1996). The ABA standards recommend an instruction advising the jury:
(1) that in order to return a verdict, each juror must agree
thereto;
(2) that jurors have a duty to consult with one another and
to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if it can be
done without violence to individual judgment;
(3) that each juror must decide the case for himself or
herself but only after an impartial consideration of the evidence
with the other jurors;
(4) that in the course of deliberations, a juror should not
hesitate to reexamine his or her own views and change an
opinion if the juror is convinced it is erroneous; and
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(5) that no juror should surrender his or her honest belief
as to the weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the
opinion of the other jurors, or for the mere purpose of
returning a verdict.
ABA Standard, 15-5.4(a). The commentary to the ABA standard clarifies that "[n]o
particular language need be used" in the instruction.

ABA Standard 15-5.4,

Commentary: Jury Charge Relating to Duties. The commentary argues that such a predeliberation instruction "does not have the coercive impact of the Allen charge"
because it "is given before the jury has retired and thus before a minority exists, and
because it makes no reference to a minority but instead charges all jurors to consult
with one another." Id. The ABA standards nevertheless provide if the jury appears
to reach an impasse, the trial court "may require the jury to continue their
deliberations and may give or repeat [such] an instruction." ABA Standard 155.4(b).
Ten years after Lactod, in State v. Clements, 967 P.2d 957 (Utah App. 1998), this
Court reaffirmed the analytical framework established in Lactod. The Court added,
however, that Allen and the Lactod analysis were not triggered in the case because
the trial court simply made a scheduling inquiry of a non-deadlocked jury. Id. at
958.
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* * *

In sum, when a jury indicates they are unable to reach a unanimous verdict,
the trial court may "send them back for further deliberation" with a verdict-urging
instruction that "'impresses upon them the importance of the case" and "urge[s]
them to come to agreement." Lactod, 761 P.2d at 30 (quoting Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at
236); accord Clements, 967 P.2d at 959. That instruction, however, may not "reach [a]
level of coerciveness amounting to a denial of a fair and impartial jury trial." Lactod,
761 P.2d at 32. In determining whether a particular Allen instruction is unduly
coercive, the appellate court "evaluates] the instruction as a whole, taking it in
context with the trial itself and the jury deliberations." Id.
C. The Allen Instruction Given in this Case Was Not Coercive,
Applying the two-tier analysis set forth in Lactod, the Allen instruction given
by the trial court below did not "reach the level of coerciveness amounting to a
denial of a fair and impartial jury trial." Id. When the instruction is evaluated "as
a whole, in the context with the trial itself and the jury's deliberations," it becomes
evident that "the jury understood that the judge was not intending to force a verdict
one way or the other, but, rather, was merely encouraging the jurors to reach an
agreement, if possible." Id.
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1. The verdict-urging instruction given by the trial court was not
coercive per se.
Defendant complains that the instruction impermissibly "expressed the
desirability of agreement, as opposed to the duty of each individual juror to decide
the case for himself and without surrendering his conscientious judgment to a
majority/ 7 Aplt. Brf. at 29. The instruction did encourage the jury to again try to
reach a unanimous verdict, but it did not do so "as opposed to/ 7 or in disregard of,
the duty of each juror to make an independent judgment. Consistent with Lactod,
the court balanced its encouragement to reach a unanimous verdict with cautions
that no juror should surrender conscientiously held beliefs or convict if reasonable
doubt exists.
The trial court asked the jury to "continue [their] deliberations in an effort to
agree upon a verdict.77 R. 343: 231, \ 1. To explain why the jurors were being
required to deliberate further, the trial court discussed the costs associated with a
hung jury, the comparative ability of this particular jury to hear the case, and the fact
that the evidence in the case was not likely to change at a new trial. R. 343: 231-32,
\% 2-3. The court also explained that in attempting to reach a unanimous verdict,
the jurors should carefully consider the views of the other jurors. R. 343:232, ^ f 4-6.
These instructions" did not tell the jury that it was required to reach a verdict/ 7
Lactod, 761 P.2d at 31, nor were they inherently coercive. To the contrary, they were
25
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/

consistent with well settled law that permits a trial court to "underscore the case's
importance" and "urge the jury to reach an agreement." Clements, 967 P.2d at 959
(emphases added); accord Lactod, 761 P.2d at 30 (holding that a court may "'impress
upon [the jury] the importance of the case'" and "'urge them to come to
agreement'") (quoting Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 236).
The trial court's instruction did not, however, end with the admonition to
further deliberate "in an effort to agree upon a verdict." R. 343:231, f 1. Consistent
with Lactod, the trial court "counterbalance^]" its admonition "with a charge to the
jury members not to give up their conscientiously held opinions" and a reminder to
the jurors "of the presumption of defendant's innocence and the burden of proof
imposed upon the state." Lactod, 761 P.2d at 30-31. In this vein, the court stated:
[^[7] You are not partisans. You are judges; judges of the facts.
Your sole interest here is to seek the truth from the evidence in the case.
Remember at all times that no juror is expected to yield a conscientious
conviction he or she may have as to the weight or effect of the evidence;
but remember also that after full deliberation and consideration of the
evidence in the case, it is your duty to agree upon a verdict if you can
do so without surrendering your conscientious conviction.
[^8] You must also remember that if the evidence in the case fails
to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused should have
your unanimous verdict of not guilty. In order to make a decision
more practicable in all cases imposes the burden of proof on one party
or the otheR. In this case the burden of proof is on the State. You may
be as leisurely in your deliberations as the occasion may require, and
should take all the time which you may feel is necessary, including
recessing until tomorrow.
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R. 343: 233, ^ 7-8. The court thus concluded its Allen instruction by emphasizing
to the jurors that their "sole interest" was to seek the truth, that they were not
expected to surrender their "conscientious conviction[s]" about the case, and that
they were obligated to return a verdict of "not guilty" if the State failed in its burden
to prove the case "beyond a reasonable doubt." R. 343: 233, ^ 7-8. Thus, as in
Lactod, the trial court's Allen instruction cannot be read as "forc[ing] the jurors to
reach a decision or to give up their conscientiously held beliefs." Lactod, 761 P.2d at

Despite the trial court's concluding emphasis on the jurors' duty not to
surrender their conscientiously held convictions and their affirmative duty to return
a not guilty verdict if the case was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant
claims that the court's urging of the jury was unduly coercive. His claim fails.
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a. The court's comment on a retrial was not coercive.
[^[2]... If you should fail to agree on a verdict, the case is left open and
must be tried again. . . .
[^[3] Any future jury must be selected in the same manner and from the
same source as you were chosen; and there is no reason to believe that the case
could ever be submitted to eight men and women more conscientious, more
impartial, or more competent to decide it;....
Claiming that" [cjriminal cases are routinely resolved without trial or without
going to trial again," defendant contends that the court's remark regarding the
necessity of a retrial was inaccurate and coercive. Aplt. Brf. at 31 (emphasis in
original). The court's reference to a new trial did not impose undue pressure on the
jury to return a verdict.
Although paragraph 2 indicated that the case "must be tried again" if the jury
deadlocked, the following paragraph suggested that the case would not necessarily
be retried: "Any future jury must be selected in the same manner and from the same
source as you were chosen/' R. 343: 231, ^f 3 (emphasis added). Reference to "any"
future jury at least suggests that there might not be another trial.
Moreover, although a possibility existed that a resolution short of trial might
have been reached before a retrial, such an outcome appears remote at best under
the circumstances of this case. The State had already demonstrated its commitment
to pursue the case to trial, despite any mistrial. Two months earlier, defendant was
tried on these very charges, but a mistrial was declared after the final instructions
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were read because the judge had earlier intimated to the jury that defendant was in
jail. See R. 304:163-66,184-88. The State retried the case, and nothing in the record
suggests that the parties were ever close to a plea bargain, either before or after the
first trial. Where the jury here voted to convict defendant of DUI, any possibility of
a plea bargain on the remaining felony drug charge was diminished even furtheR.
And the State would not have simply abandoned the charge, especially where
defendant had demonstrated a serious drug problem in the case itself. Indeed, at
one hearing in the case, defendant appeared in court while under the influence of
drugs. R. 46. The court immediately revoked his supervised release, placed him in
custody, and imposed the original bail amount. R. 6,46.
Even if the judge misstated the law, that misstatement was not fatal to the
instruction. Indeed, this Court in Lactod upheld a jury instruction that included
language indicating that a new trial would in fact be held if the jury deadlocked.
The judge in Lactod instructed the jury that if they deadlocked, "we get to send you
folks home and reschedule this whole thing and start over again/ 7 Lactod, 761 P.2d
at 28. Continuing, the judge said he was "sure" they "d[id]n't want to do that." Id.
The judge then suggested the opposite — that if they deadlocked, another trial may
not be possible: "[0]ne problem is I'm only going to be here six or eight weeks and
we don't have another day to do this case." Id. These remarks had much more
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potential to pressure the jury into reaching a verdict than those presented by the trial
court here. This Court nevertheless concluded that they were not unduly coercive
because they were "counterbalanced" by a caution for the jurors not to surrender
conscientiously-held opinions. Id. at 31. As explained above, the trial court's
remarks in this case were also counterbalanced with a similar, but greater, caution.
b. The court's comment on trial expense was not coercive.
[^[2]... The trial has been expensive in time, effort and money
to both the defense and the prosecution Obviously another trial
would only serve to increase the costs to both sides; . . . .
Defendant contends that the court's reference to the expenses of the trial and
a retrial was inappropriate, operating to " guilt" them into reaching a verdict. Aplt.
Brf. at 30-31. The trial court's reference to these expenses, however, did not in any
way suggest that the jury was required to reach a verdict. The court simply
explained that another attempt to reach a verdict was appropriate, given the time,
effort, and money expended by all concerned in this trial, and which would have to
be expended in another trial. In other words, the case was worth "another try" by
the jury.
Undoubtedly, a discussion of trial expense "can" increase the coercive effect
of an Allen charge, but it "does not necessarily make a charge more coercive."
McElhiney, 275 F.3d at 945 (emphases in original). In this case, the court did not
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elaborate on the expenses of trial; it simply explained why further deliberation was
warranted. This case is thus unlike McElhiney, where the judge told the jury that
their deadlock was "very distressing to [him] because [the case] has been one of the
greatest major efforts ever made in time and attention and money that [he had]
noted in [his] 24 years as being a judge/ 7 Id. at 934, 945. The trial judge in
McElhiney did not simply mention the costs of trial, as the trial court did here. He
elaborated on those costs, comparing them to the costs of other trials, and told the
jury that he was distressed because they could not reach a verdict

No such

elaboration was present here and the court signaled no such anxiety.
Moreover, the comment in this case was more innocuous than the comment
made on trial expenses in Lactod, with which this Court found no erroR. The judge
in Lactod told the jury to "add up the time we have all got involved in this case" and
noted that "we have got two or three weeks into it figuring all our individual time."
Lactod, 761 P.2d at 28. The judge then directed the jury to resume their deliberations
and expressed his "hope" that the jury would return a verdict that night, "because
[he] certainly d[id]n't want to throw away this day." Id. The jury could have
interpreted these remarks as suggesting that if they did not reach a verdict, they
would be to blame for wasting the judge's time. This Court nevertheless held that
the comments were not unduly coercive. Id. at 31. "Although [the judge] did
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indicate that he and the jury had invested a substantial amount of time in the case,
he was only stating the obvious/' Id.
Unlike the remarks inMcElhiney and Lactod, the court's remarks here were no
more than a simple reference to trial expenses. The judge did not elaborate on those
expenses, nor did he express anxiety for wasted resources should the jury be unable
to reach a verdict. Moreover, the remarks were consistent with one of the legitimate
purposes for the Allen instruction, "namely, 'the avoidance of the societal costs of
retrial7 both in time and m o n e y , . . . . " Id. at 30.
c. The court did not opine on the weight and sufficiency of
the evidence.
[Tf2] -.-.. [T]here is no reason to believe that the case can be tried again by
either side better or more exhaustively than it has been tried before you.
[^[3].. ,[A]nd there is no reason to believe . . . that a more clear or clearer
evidence-excuse me-or that more clear or clearer evidence could be -produced
on behalf of either side.
Defendant contends that the court's reference to the evidence constituted an
improper comment on the weight and sufficiency of the evidence, leaving the jury
"with the impression that the evidence was clear: resolution should be
straightforward." Aplt. Brf. at 33. Contrary to defendant's claim, the language in
no way implied that the evidence was either sufficient or deficient. If anything, it
disavowed any notion that the State would produce missing evidence in a retrial.
A comment that the evidence was as clear as it was going to get would only cement
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a dissenting juror's view of reasonable doubt and give majority jurors pause if their
conclusions were based on assumptions regarding missing evidence.
d. The instruction did not order the jury to reach a verdict.
[%3] . . . [TJhere is no reason to believe that the case could ever be
submitted to eight men and women more conscientious, more impartial, or
more competent to decide it;....
Defendant contends that the court's remarks here "stated there was no reason
to believe that [the] jurors could not reach a verdict."

Aplt. Brf. at 29. The

instruction made no such statement. Rather, the instruction stated"there is no
reason to believe that the case could ever be submitted to eight men and women
more conscientious, more impartial, or more competent to decide it." R. 343:231-32.
It is one thing to say there is no reason to believe the case could be submitted to a
more impartial or more competent jury. It is quite another to say there is no reason
to believe the jury could not reach a verdict. The latter statement may very well be
construed as a comment on the strength of the evidence, but the former may not.
It simply reassures the jurors that they are as well equipped to make what may be
a difficult decision as any other jury.
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e. The court's remarks to minority jurors were not unduly
coercive under Lozvenfield and were in any event
tempered by remarks to all the jurors.
[^[4] In order to bring eight minds to a unanimous result, you must
examine the questions submitted to you with candor and frankness and with
proper deference to and regard for the opinions of each otheR. That is to say in
conferring together, each of you should pay due attention and respect to the
views of the others, and listen to each other's arguments with the disposition
to re-examine your own views.
[\5] If a substantial majority of your number are for a conviction, each
dissenting juror ought to consider whetlier a doubt in his or her own mind is
a reasonable one, since it appears to make no effective impression upon the
minds of so many equally conscientious fellow jurors, who bear the same
responsibility, serve under the same oath, and have heard the same evidence,
with, we may assume, the same attention and equal desire to arrive at the
truth.
[^[6] On the other hand, if a majority or even a lesser number of you are
for acquittal, the other jurors ought to ask themselves again, and most
thoughtfully, whether they do not have a reason to doubt the correction of a
judgment, which is not shared by several of their fellow jurors, and whether
they should distrust the weight and sufficiency of evidence which fails to
convince several of their fellow jurors beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendant argues that in instructing the jurors to consider the views of other
jurors, it improperly targeted the minority juroR. See Aplt. Brf. at 34-37. He claims
that the instruction was confusing and exerted undue pressure on the minority juror
to conform to the majority view. See Aplt. Brf. at 34-37. This claim also fails.
Since the U.S. Supreme Court in Allen upheld use of the verdict-urging
instruction for deadlocked juries, language directed at minority jurors has been
criticized as "an 'unbalanced' charge which tends to coerce only the jurors in the
minority to reconsider their positions."
34

ABA Standard 15-5.4, Commentary.

Certainly, language directing jurors in the minority to consider the views of the
majority jurors, and not vice versa, may have a greater tendency to be coercive than
language that does not differentiate between minority and majority jurors.
However, such language cannot be examined in a vacuum.
Paragraph 5 of the instruction did advise jurors in the minority to consider
whether their doubt was "a reasonable one/' given that the majority jurors found
no such doubt. R. 343:232, ^f 5. However, paragraph 6 of the instruction also stated
that "if a majority or even a lesser number of you are for acquittal, the other jurors
ought to ask themselves again, and most thoughtfully, whether they do not have a
reason to doubt the correction of a judgment, which is not shared by several of their
fellow jurors, and whether they should distrust the weight and sufficiency of
evidence which fails to convince several of their fellow jurors beyond a reasonable
doubt." R. 343: 232-33, f 6 (emphasis added). Because only one juror in this case
constituted the minority, the instruction was less than ideal. However, its clear
import was that even if the majority of jurors favored conviction, they should
nevertheless consider whether a reasonable doubt existed.
Perhaps most significantly, paragraphs 5 and 6 were preceded by a paragraph
that instructed all jurors to carefully consider the opinions of the other jurors:
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[1f4] In order to bring eight minds to a unanimous result, you
must examine the questions submitted to you with candor
and frankness and with proper deference to and regard for
the opinions of each otheR. That is to say in conferring
together, each of you should pay due attention and respect to
the views of the others, and listen to each other's arguments
with the disposition to re-examine your own views.
R. 343: 232, ^ 4. Additionally, and as already discussed, the Allen instruction
concluded with a strong admonition to the jurors not to surrender their
conscientiously held beliefs and a reminder that defendant was entitled to acquittal
unless the State proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. R. 343: 233, f f 7-8. In
this context, any danger of coercion resulting from paragraphs 5 and 6 was
diminished, if not lost.
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court in Allen specifically held that" [i]t
certainly cannot be the law that each juror should not listen with deference to the
arguments, and with a distrust of his own judgment, if he finds a large majority of
the jury taking a different view of the case than what he does himself/7 Allen, 164
U.S. at 501. In Lowenfield, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that an instruction
that "speak[S] specifically to the minority jurors" may have the tendency to exert
greater pressure on them, but nevertheless upheld the Allen holding as "beyond
dispute." Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 237-38.
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2. The verdict-urging instruction given by the trial court was not
coercive under the circumstances of this case.
As noted," [i]f the terms of the charge are not coercive per se," the Court "must
[next] consider, under the specific circumstances of the case, whether the charge was
proper after the jury had reported an inability to reach a verdict." Lactod, 761 P.2d
at 31. In doing so, the Court may consider any colloquy between the judge and the
jury foreman, the circumstances surrounding the giving of the instruction, and the
ABA standard governing verdict-urging instructions. Id. The instruction given here
was not coercive under the circumstances of this case.
The most relevant fact in considering the specific circumstances of this case
is the polling of the jury after they returned the verdicts. The trial court asked
whether "either counsel [would] like the jury polled." R. 343: 235. Counsel for
defendant replied in the affirmative. R. 343: 235. The court clerk then polled each
juror, asking them "to answer 'yes' or 'no' to the following question: Were these and
are these now your verdicts?" R. 343:235. Laura Martin answered, "Yes." Marilyn
Boston answered, "Yes." Brian Koji answered, "Yes." Tamara Romero answered,
"Yes." Christine Weston answered, "Yes." Denise McConkie answered, "Yes."
Mandy Pappadakas answered, "Yes." And Julie Anastossi answered, "Yes." R. 343:
235-36.
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The answers from this poll are the best evidence that the Allen instruction did
not coerce the jurors' verdict. Indeed, the very "purpose of jury polling is to
'determine that the verdict signed by the foreman is that of the individual jurors and
not one that has been coerced or caused by mistake.'" State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5, Tf
12,999 P.2d 565 (quoting State v. Russell, 733 P.2d 162,164 (Utah 1987)). The jurors'
responses here were unequivocal and no one questioned their responses. See R. 343:
236. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that any of the jurors lied.
Defendant nevertheless contends that the jury's representation of deadlock
"should have been acceptable to the trial court,"and it thus improperly "urged the
jury to come to a unanimous verdict." Aplt. Brf. at 42-43. This argument lacks
merit. Indeed, the ABA standards, which defendant asks this Court to adopt,
specifically state that "[i]f it appears to the court that the jury has been unable to
agree, the court may require the jury to continue their deliberations" and give or
repeat an instruction "on [the jury's] responsibilities in the course of deliberations."
ABA Standard 15-5.4(b) & Commentary. The Commentary indicates that "[tjhis
may be done when the jury has indicated its inability to reach an agreement or has
deliberated for some time without reaching an agreement." ABA Standard 15-5.4,
Commentary. And as further noted in the Commentary, court decisions also "take
the view that a trial judge should not discharge a jury merely because it reports that
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it has not been able to agree." Id. In this case, the jury had only deliberated for some
three hours. See R. 343:178-227. It was not unreasonable for the court to require the
jury to deliberate further.
Defendant also argues that because the jury had been appropriately instructed
prior to deliberations and had not requested further instruction, the verdictencouraging instruction "was improper," conveying "the notion that by failing to
come to an agreement, the jury had disappointed the court and acted contrary to
earlier instructions." Aplt. Brf. at 39-40. This argument also fails.
It is true that before deliberations began, the court instructed the jurors on
their duties during deliberations:
It's rarely good for a juror, on entering the jury room, to make an
emphatic expression of opinion or to announce a determination to
stand for a certain verdict. When that's done, a person's pride may
block appropriate consideration of the case. But don't make a decision
just to agree with everyone else either: your verdict must be your own.
Help each other arrive at the truth. Use your common memory,
common understanding, and common sense. Talk about the case with
each other as you ponder and deliberate. And respect and consider the
opinions of your fellow jurors. If you're persuaded that a decision you
initially made was wrong, then don't hesitate to change your mind.
Also, don't resort to chance or some form of decision-making other
than honest deliberation.
R. 222 (Instruction No. 4). This instruction was consistent with the ABA standard
for pre-deliberation instructions. It advised the jurors: (1) "to consult with one
another" in trying to reach an agreement; (2) to "decide the case for himself or
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herself" after mutual consideration of the evidence; (3) "to reexamine his or her own
views and change an opinion' 7 if convinced that it was erroneous; and (4) to not
surrender "an honest belief .. . solely because of the opinion of the other jurors, or
for the mere purpose of returning a verdict." ABA Standard 15-5.4(a).4
Giving this ABA-compatible instruction did not render the subsequent Allen
charge coercive. The Allen instruction did depart from the ABA Standard by
speaking to the minority jurors and referencing the expenses associated with a retrial.
However, and as noted above, it counterbalanced its encouragement for the jury to
reach a verdict by emphasizing that the jurors were not to surrender their
conscientiously held convictions and were to remember that defendant was entitled
to acquittal unless the State proved the case beyond a reasonable doubt. R. 343:233,
TfTf 7-8. Significantly, the instruction also directed the jury to apply the instruction
"in conjunction with all of the instructions" the judge previously gave them. R. 343:
233, f 9. Instruction No. 4 thus tempered any coercive elements of the subsequent
Allen instruction. And the court was clear in both: reach an agreement if you can, but
do not do so "just to agree with everyone else," R. 222, or if doing so requires you to
"surrender[] your conscientious conviction," R. 343: 233, Tf 7.

4

Also consistent with the ABA standards, Instruction No. 7 advised the jury
that its verdict must be unanimous. See R. 223.
40

Defendant further argues that the trial court's earlier refusal to provide
additional evidence requested by the jury, and its subsequent return of a verdict 26
minutes after the verdict-encouraging instruction, establishes that the undecided
juror "was coerced into a [guilty] verdict/7 Aplt. Brf. at 43. This argument too fails.
Defendant cites Lowenfield for the proposition that the return of a verdict 26 minutes
after an Allen instruction is given establishes that the instruction was coercive. See
Aplt. Brf. at 43. Yet, in Lowenfield, the Court found no coercion even though the jury
returned a death sentence 30 minutes after receiving the Allen instruction. Lowenfield,
484 U.S. at 235,241.5 Moreover, the period of deliberation was roughly one-sixth of
the time the jury had previously deliberated. This period of time does not suggest
that the jury was "blasted" into a verdict, as defendant contends. Aplt. Brf. at 43.
D. Due Process Does Not Require Adoption of the ABA Standard for
Instructing Juries on their Duties During Deliberations.
Defendant asks this Court to "disavow use of the Allen charge in its various
forms in this jurisdiction, and support use of the American Bar Association standards
for deadlocked juries." Aplt. Brf. at 9,10,18,24. As discussed above, this Court has
already held that in assessing the coercive effect of an Allen instruction, the Court
should "consider[ ] . . . the American Bar Association Standards on Criminal Justice

5

The Court's conclusion in this regard was facilitated because counsel did not
object to the instruction, as counsel did here. See Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 240.
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Relating to Trial by Jury," i.e., ABA Standard 15-5.4. Lactod, 761 P.2d at 31 (quotation
and citation omitted). However, the adoption of the ABA Standard as a matter of
constitutional law, as defendant seems to suggest, is not warranted. Due process
entitles a defendant to a fair and impartial trial. McElhiney, 275 F.3d at 937. No more,
and no less. Compliance with the ABA Standard may very well be a "safe haven"
against challenges that a trial judge coerced the jury into a verdict. It is not, however,
a prerequisite to due process and defendant has cited no controlling authority for this
proposition.
As held by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, "[t]he ultimate question . . . is
whether the Allen instruction [given by a trial court] was "impermissibly coercive in
a way that undermined the integrity of the deliberation process." Id. at 940; accord
Lactod, 761 P.2d at 32 (finding that the Allen instructions "d[id] n o t . . . reach the level
of coerciveness amounting to a denial of a fair and impartial jury trial"). The United
States Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court, and this Court have answered this
question by examining, on a case-by-case basis, the content of the instruction and the
context in which it was given. See Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 237-41; Brown, 853 P.2d at
861; Lactod, 761 P.2d at 28-32. Where both the United States Supreme Court and the
Utah Supreme Court have approved the non-coercive use of Allen instructions, this
Court may not disavow them. See State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 (Utah 1994)
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(holding that the doctrine of "[v]ertical stare decisis . . . compels a court to follow
strictly the decisions rendered by a higher court/7 including "any 'judicial dicta' that
may be announced by the higher court77).6

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
defendant's conviction.
Respectfully submitted on 18 January 2008.
Mark L. Shurtleff
Utah Attorney General

rey,
distant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee

6

The State agrees with defendant, however, that an unduly coercive Allen
instruction to a deadlocked jury warrants remand for a new trial without a further
showing of harm.
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Addendum B
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(Recess taken)

2

(Court and Counsel and defendant in chambers)

3

THE COURT: All right.

I received a note from the

4

jurors containing five questions.

5

On the back, after discussion with Counsel, I have endorsed

6

that the jury has received all of the evidence that it's going

7

to receive.

8

memories for what the evidence was. Okay?

9

I reviewed it with Counsel.

Please rely on your individual and collective

MS. VIERA: Okay.

10

THE COURT: Any objection?

11

MS. VIERA: No.

12

THE COURT: Okay.

13

(Recess taken)

14

(Court and Counsel in chambers)

15

THE COURT: Go on the record in chambers in the matter

16

of the State vs. Russell David Harry.

17

Counsel.

18

the jury indicating that they've reached a decision on Count

19

II, not what the decision is; and that the jury is deadlocked

20

seven to one on Count I.

21
22
23
24
25

Mr. Harry is not present.

I'm in chambers with
I've received a note from

Counsel, what do you propose to do?

MR. NELSON: This hasn't happened to me before, Judge.
Do you mind if you ask what the options are?
THE COURT: I don't mind, if you don't mind me
answering them.
MS. VIERA: This hasn't happened to me either, your

-2281

Honor.

2

THE COURT: Okay.

Your options are either party may

3

move —

4

have an Allen charge prepared that I've issued before, I

5

believe is appropriate.

6

deadlocked and declare a mistrial.

7
8

may request that the Court issue an Allen charge.

I

Alternatively is to declare the jury

MR. NELSON: At the risk of sounding uninformed, can
you briefly describe an Allen charge for me?

9

THE COURT: An Allen charge is also called (inaudible)

10

charge or (inaudible) charge; and it is the name given to an

11

additional instruction.

12

inform the jury that they're not to forego, you know, their

13

independence; but at the same time, they should think long

14

and hard about deadlocking.

15

You bring the jury back in, and

I'll give you the charge so you can both review it;

16

but it basically says if there's a substantial number for a

17

conviction, and you're the sole holdout, you know, you might

18

want to think about that.

19

substantial number for acquittal —

20

number.

21

reasonable doubt standard, you might want to think about how

22

you could meet that standard, if you've got

23
24
25

On the other hand, if there's a
or not even a substantial

If there's some number for acquittal, given the

—

MR. NELSON: It would be my preference to go with the
Allen charge, Judge.
THE COURT: Well, I think that before you make your

-229decision, you both should have an opportunity to review the
Allen charge, and you know, Allen charges are fraught with
(inaudible).

This one I have tried to balance, looking at

some of the case law so that it is not —

it doesn't look like

an arm twist, and emphasizes, you know, that they shouldn't
forego their kind of individual conscious decision making,
okay?
MR. NELSON: Once again, Judge, at the risk of sounding
uninformed about this issue, is this something that Ms. Viera
and I have to come to a joint conclusion on, or is this
THE COURT: It is
MR. NELSON: —

—

someone's option

THE COURT: It is not.

It is —

Court could do it on its own initiative.
comes —

—

—
you know, I think the
I'd prefer that it

the request comes from a party, rather than the Court.

I don't know that I would do it without a request from a party;
and then it's that you argue your positions.

You know, just

as an example, it is typically the State that asks for it.
Defense objects to it.

However, last week, as

MS. VIERA: (Inaudible)
THE COURT: —

—

—

Ms. Viera may know, it was Ms. Viera's

office that asked for the Allen charge over the State's
objection, received it from me, and the defendant was
acquitted.
MR. NELSON: Thank you for filling me in on that, your
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Honor.

2
3

THE COURT: Yeah, I appreciate doing that.
right?

Okay, all right, let's

Is that all

—

4

(Recording stops)

5

(Court and Counsel and defendant in chambers)

6

THE COURT: We're on the record.

7

you decided?

8
9

Counsel, what have

MS. VIERA: Your Honor, I'm going to object to the
charge.

10

MR. NELSON: I'd ask you to issue it, Judge.

11

THE COURT: All right, what's the basis for the

12

objection?

13

MS. VIERA: Your Honor, in regard to this charge, I

14

believe that it places undue pressure upon that single juror,

15

one way or the other, either it's a conviction or it's an

16

acquittal; and that if that is simply for an —

17

holdout for acquittal, that that charge will overcome his own

18

independent conviction in regard to this case, and may result

19

in Mr. Harry not having a unanimous verdict, but simply being a

20

verdict that has been tainted by outside pressure.

the only

21

THE COURT: All right.

22

an appropriate one, Ms. Viera.

23

avoid that particular issue.

24

idea, frankly, which way the jury was —

25

going to give them the charge, and give them an opportunity
i

I believe that the charge is
That I've tried to craft it to
As a consequence —

I have no

is inclined; and I'm
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with that charge to continue their deliberations.

2

you in the courtroom.

3

(Recess taken)

4

COURT BAILIFF: All rise for the jury.

5

(Jury enters the courtroom)

6

COURT BAILIFF: Be seated.

7

THE COURT: All right.

So I'll meet

We're back on the record in

8

the matter of the State of Utah vs. Russell David Harry, case

9

No. 051908113.

I want to note for the record that all Counsel

10

are present, as is Mr. Harry.

11

to ask that you continue your deliberations in an effort to

12

agree upon a verdict and dispose of this case.

13

additional comments I would like for you to consider as you do

14

so.

15

Members of the jury, I'm going

This is an important case.

I have a few

The trial has been

16

expensive in time, effort and money to both the defense and

17

the prosecution.

18

case is left open and must be tried again.

19

trial would only serve to increase the costs to both sides; and

20

there is no reason to believe that the case can be tried again

21

by either side better or more exhaustively than it has been

22

tried before you.

If you should fail to agree on a verdict, the
Obviously another

23

Any future jury must be selected in the same manner

24

and from the same source as you were chosen; and there is no

25

reason to believe that the case could ever be submitted to
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eight men and women more conscientious, more impartial, or

2

more competent to decide it; or that a more clear or clearer

3

evidence —

4

be produced on behalf of either side.

5

excuse me —

or that more or clearer evidence could

In order to bring eight minds to a unanimous result,

6

you must examine the questions submitted to you with candor

7

and frankness and with proper deference to and regard for the

8

opinions of each other.

9

each of you should pay due attention and respect to the views

That is to say in conferring together,

10

of the others, and listen to each other's arguments with the

11

disposition to re-examine your own views.

12

If a substantial majority of your number are for a

13

conviction, each dissenting juror ought to consider whether a

14

doubt in his or her own mind is a reasonable one, since it

15 I appears to make no effective impression upon the minds of so
16

many equally conscientious fellow jurors, who bear the same

17

responsibility, serve under the same oath, and have heard the

18

same evidence, with, we may assume, the same attention and

19

equal desire to arrive at the truth.

20

On the other hand, if a majority or even a lesser

21

number of you are for acquittal, the other jurors ought to

22

seriously ask themselves again, and most thoughtfully, whether

23

they do not have a reason to doubt the correction of a

24

judgment, which is not shared by several of their fellow

25

jurors, and whether they should distrust the weight and
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sufficiency of evidence which fails to convince several of

2

their fellow jurors beyond a reasonable doubt.

3

You are not partisans.

You are judges; judges of the

4

facts.

5

evidence in the case.

6

expected to yield a conscientious conviction he or she may have

7

as to the weight or effect of the evidence; but remember also

8

that after full deliberation and consideration of the evidence

9

in the case, it is your duty to agree upon a verdict if you can

10
11

Your sole interest here is to seek the truth from the
Remember at all times that no juror is

do so without surrendering your conscientious conviction.
You must also remember that if the evidence in the

12

case fails to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the

13

accused should have your unanimous verdict of not guilty.

14

In order to make a decision more practicable in all cases

15

imposes the burden of proof on one party or the other.

16

this case the burden of proof is on the State.

17

leisurely in your deliberations as the occasion may require,

18

and should take all the time which you may feel is necessary,

19

including recessing until tomorrow.

20

In

You may be as

I will ask now that you retire once again, and

21

continue your deliberations with these additional comments in

22

mind to be applied in conjunction with all of the instructions

23

I have previously given to you.

24

have this instruction copied and sent in shortly.

25

Members of the jury, I will

(Jury exits the courtroom)

All rise.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 1: It's now my duty, as judge, to instruct you as to the law that
applies to this case. And it's your duty, as jurors, to follow that law.
INSTRUCTION NO. 2: You may take the following items only into the jury room: these
instructions, the exhibits admitted in evidence, your notes, and the verdict form.
INSTRUCTION NO. 3: The first thing to do in the jury room is choose a "Foreperson".
The Foreperson's duties are to keep order, allow everyone a chance to speak, and represent the jury
in any communications that you make. The Foreperson has no more power than any other juror in
deciding what the verdict should be.
INSTRUCTION NO. 4: It's rarely good for a juror, on entering the jury room, to make an
emphatic expression of opinion or to announce a determination to stand for a certain verdict. When
that's done, a person's pride may block appropriate consideration of the case. But don't make a
decision just to agree with everyone else either: your verdict must be your own. Help each other
arrive at the truth. Use your common memory, common understanding, and common sense. Talk
about the case with each other as you ponder and deliberate. And respect and consider the opinions
of your fellow jurors. If you're persuaded that a decision you initially made was wrong, then don't
hesitate to change your mind. Also, don't resort to chance or some form of decision-making other
than honest deliberation.
INSTRUCTION NO. 5: If you think that you need more information or a clarification,
write a note and give it to the bailiff. I'll review it with the lawyers and answer your question, if
appropriate; however, these instructions, should contain all the information that you need in order
to reach a verdict based upon the evidence.
INSTRUCTION NO. 6: Your duty is to decide this case and this case alone. You shouldn't
use this case to correct perceived wrongs in other cases or to express individual or collective views
about anything other than the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Put a little differently, your verdict
should reflect the facts, as found by you, applied to the law explained in these instructions and
shouldn't be distorted by any outside factors or objectives.

INSTRUCTION NO. 7: This being a criminal case, your verdict must be unanimous on
each element of the offense. When you're all in agreement, then you've reached a verdict and your
work is finished. At that time, the Foreperson should date and sign the verdict form that reflects your
decision. The Foreperson should then notify the bailiff that you're ready to return to court.
INSTRUCTION NO. 8: After you've given me the verdict form, the clerk may ask each
of you about it to make sure that you agree with it. I'll then excuse you. Afterward, you may talk
about the case with anyone. Likewise, you're not required to talk about it. If anyone insists on
talking to you about the case when you don't want to, please tell the court clerk.
INSTRUCTION NO. 9: You're instructed that the defendant, Russell David Harry, is
charged in the Information with the commission of one count of the unlawful possession of a
controlled substance, a 3rd degree felony, and one count of driving under the influence of alcohol
and/or drugs, a class B misdemeanor. More specifically, the Information alleges that [Information
read].
INSTRUCTION NO. 10: You're not to consider Instruction No. 9 as a statement of facts;
rather, you're to regard it as a summary of the allegations in the Information.
INSTRUCTION NO. 11: The defendant has entered a plea of not guilty. The plea of not
guilty denies each of the essential allegations of the counts contained in the Information and casts
upon the prosecution the burden of proving each to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt.
INSTRUCTION NO. 12: You're instructed that the mere fact that the defendant has been
arrested, charged with this offense, and held to answer to the charge by a committing magistrate,
isn't any evidence of guilt or even a circumstance that you should consider in determining guilt or
innocence.
INSTRUCTION NO. 13: In arriving at a verdict, you shouldn't discuss or consider the
subject of penalty or punishment. That's a matter for the court and other governmental agencies and
mustn't in any way affect your decision as to the defendant's guilt or innocence.
INSTRUCTION NO. 14: All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in favor
of innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
This presumption is not a mere formality, but is a substantial part of the law intended, as far as is
possible, to guard against the danger of an innocent person being unjustly punished.
The presumption of innocence must continue to prevail in your minds until you're satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant. And, in the case of a reasonable doubt as
to the defendant's guilt, he/she is entitled to an acquittal.
Also, the burden is always on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This
burden never shifts to the defendant for the law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case
the burden or duty of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence.

